Add fail-closed WireGuard container gateway

2026-08-22 20:48:49 +02:00
parent 2f3bdde8b0
commit 0e5876f1a9
17 changed files with 365 additions and 109 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+FROM debian:13-slim
+
+RUN apt-get update \
+    && DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
+       ca-certificates iproute2 iptables procps socat wireguard-tools \
+    && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
+
+COPY entrypoint.sh /usr/local/sbin/mike-ai-wireguard-entrypoint
+COPY healthcheck.sh /usr/local/sbin/mike-ai-wireguard-healthcheck
+RUN chmod 0755 /usr/local/sbin/mike-ai-wireguard-entrypoint \
+               /usr/local/sbin/mike-ai-wireguard-healthcheck
+
+ENTRYPOINT ["/usr/local/sbin/mike-ai-wireguard-entrypoint"]
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+set -eu
+
+SOURCE=${WG_CONFIG_SOURCE:-/run/secrets/fritz-athena.conf}
+RUNTIME=/run/wireguard/wg0.conf
+
+[ -s "$SOURCE" ] || { echo "WireGuard configuration is missing" >&2; exit 1; }
+install -d -m 0700 /run/wireguard
+
+# Fritzbox exports global DNS directives and wg-quick hooks. DNS is assigned
+# per application container by Docker; executable hooks are deliberately not
+# accepted from a secret file. All cryptographic values remain untouched.
+awk '
+  /^[[:space:]]*(DNS|Table|PreUp|PostUp|PreDown|PostDown|SaveConfig)[[:space:]]*=/ { next }
+  /^\[Interface\][[:space:]]*$/ { print; print "Table = off"; next }
+  { print }
+' "$SOURCE" >"$RUNTIME"
+chmod 0600 "$RUNTIME"
+
+# Docker deliberately keeps /proc/sys read-only inside this narrowly
+# privileged container. Table=off prevents wg-quick from trying to modify
+# global policy-routing sysctls; the two required routes are installed below.
+physical_default=$(ip -4 route show default | head -n 1)
+physical_gateway=$(printf '%s\n' "$physical_default" | awk '{for (i=1; i<=NF; i++) if ($i == "via") print $(i+1)}')
+physical_device=$(printf '%s\n' "$physical_default" | awk '{for (i=1; i<=NF; i++) if ($i == "dev") print $(i+1)}')
+
+wg-quick up "$RUNTIME"
+
+# Keep the encrypted peer itself reachable over Docker's physical network,
+# then make the tunnel the namespace default. Connected Docker routes remain
+# intact for the reverse proxies and internal service discovery.
+endpoint=$(wg show wg0 endpoints | awk 'NR == 1 { print $2 }')
+case "$endpoint" in
+  \[*\]:*) endpoint_ip=${endpoint#\[}; endpoint_ip=${endpoint_ip%%\]*} ;;
+  *:*) endpoint_ip=${endpoint%:*} ;;
+  *) endpoint_ip= ;;
+esac
+
+if [ -n "$endpoint_ip" ] && [ -n "$physical_gateway" ] && [ -n "$physical_device" ]; then
+  case "$endpoint_ip" in
+    *:*) : ;; # Docker gateway networks are intentionally IPv4-only.
+    *) ip -4 route replace "$endpoint_ip/32" via "$physical_gateway" dev "$physical_device" ;;
+  esac
+fi
+ip -4 route replace default dev wg0
+ip -6 route replace default dev wg0 2>/dev/null || true
+
+cleanup() {
+  kill "${proxy_ui_pid:-}" "${proxy_router_pid:-}" 2>/dev/null || true
+  wg-quick down "$RUNTIME" 2>/dev/null || true
+}
+trap cleanup EXIT INT TERM
+
+# Forward only explicitly selected Docker networks into the tunnel. The
+# gateway itself is the only container that receives NET_ADMIN.
+iptables -P FORWARD DROP
+iptables -A FORWARD -o wg0 -j ACCEPT
+iptables -A FORWARD -i wg0 -m conntrack --ctstate ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT
+iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o wg0 -j MASQUERADE
+
+# Nothing is published on the physical host. These listeners exist only in
+# the WireGuard container namespace and forward VPN clients to internal names.
+socat TCP-LISTEN:8080,bind=0.0.0.0,reuseaddr,fork TCP:open-webui:8080 &
+proxy_ui_pid=$!
+socat TCP-LISTEN:8081,bind=0.0.0.0,reuseaddr,fork TCP:router:8081 &
+proxy_router_pid=$!
+
+wait "$proxy_ui_pid"
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+set -eu
+wg show wg0 >/dev/null
+ip link show wg0 | grep -q 'state UNKNOWN\|state UP'
+latest=$(wg show wg0 latest-handshakes | cut -f2 | head -n 1)
+now=$(date +%s)
+[ "${latest:-0}" -gt 0 ]
+[ $((now - latest)) -lt 180 ]
+kill -0 1